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Abstract
This paper examines whether the systemic risk of financial institutions is associated with 
the risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation. We measure manage-
rial risk-taking incentives with the sensitivities of chief executive officer (CEO) and chief 
financial officer (CFO) compensation to changes in stock prices (pay-performance sensi-
tivity) and stock return volatility (pay-risk sensitivity). Using data on large U.S. financial 
institutions over the period 2005–2010, we document a negative association between sys-
temic risk and the sensitivities of CEO and CFO compensation to stock return volatility. 
However, our results also demonstrate that financial institutions with greater managerial 
risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher levels of systemic risk dur-
ing the peak of the financial crisis in 2008. We further document that the relation between 
pay-performance sensitivity and systemic risk is essentially nonexistent. Overall, our 
empirical findings indicate that the association between managerial risk-taking incentives 
and banks’ systemic risk is ambiguous and is not stable over time.
Keywords Executive compensation · Risk-taking incentives · Systemic risk · Bank risk-
taking · Financial crisis
JEL Classification G01 · G20 · G21 · G30 · G32 · G34
1 Introduction
“Compensation practices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned 
incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to bank losses and financial insta-
bility.”
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
2009a)
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This paper examines whether the systemic risk of financial institutions is associated with 
the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top executives. In the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, policy makers, regulators, and bank supervision 
authorities have alleged that the risk-taking incentives generated by executive compen-
sation policies at banking organizations were among the key factors contributing to the 
development of the crisis (see e.g., Kirkpatrick 2009; Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision 2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009b, 2010; Mehran 
et  al. 2011). Furthermore, the financial crisis revealed the distinct adverse consequences 
of excessive bank risk-taking and systemic risk on global financial stability, economic 
growth, and societal well-being. Given that the compensation policies of top executives 
are generally designed to mitigate agency problems and to maximize shareholder value, 
the incentives generated by executive compensation may encourage excessive risk-taking 
in the financial industry (e.g., Palia and Porter 2004; Chen et al. 2006; Bebchuk et al. 2010; 
Bebchuk and Spamann 2010; Bai and Elyasiani 2013; Gande and Kalpathy 2017).
Do compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top executives increase the riski-
ness of financial institutions and the level of systemic risk? In this paper, we aim to address 
this question by empirically examining the linkage between systemic risk and the sensi-
tivities of chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) compensation 
to changes in stock prices and stock return volatility.1 Using data on large, publicly traded 
U.S. financial institutions, we find somewhat ambiguous evidence on the association 
between managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions. 
Our results indicate that the sensitivities of top executive compensation to volatility are 
negatively related to systemic risk. However, our empirical findings also demonstrate that 
financial institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with 
significantly higher levels of systemic risk in 2008 during the peak of the global financial 
crisis.
Our analysis is closely related to the prior literature addressing the effects of manage-
rial compensation structures on bank performance and risk-taking.2 Previous studies have 
examined how different elements of top executive compensation and the incentives gener-
ated by managerial compensation structures are reflected in the riskiness of financial insti-
tutions (e.g., Chen et al. 2006; DeYoung et al. 2013; Guo et al. 2015; Minhat and Abdullah 
2016; Gande and Kalpathy 2017; Bharati and Jia 2018). Using data on U.S. commercial 
banks, Chen et al. (2006) document that option-based compensation and the option-based 
wealth of bank CEOs induce greater risk-taking. DeYoung et al. (2013) document that the 
compensation structures of CEOs are important determinants of bank business policies and 
risk-taking. Their findings also suggest that banks with higher CEO compensation sensitiv-
ities to volatility are associated with higher levels of systematic and idiosyncratic risk and 
are more involved with non-traditional banking activities. Guo et al. (2015) examine the 
relation between CEO compensation structure and bank risk-taking, and find that a higher 
proportion of incentive compensation increases default risk and stock return volatility.
The studies perhaps most related to our analysis are those of Bai and Elyasiani (2013) 
and Bharati and Jia (2018) which examine the linkages between CEOs’ compensation-
based risk-taking incentives and banks’ default risk, stock return volatility, systematic risk, 
1 We focus on CEO and CFO compensation incentives because they are arguably the most powerful execu-
tives within a firm and have substantial influence on corporate decisions and outcomes.
2 Mehran et al. (2011) and de Haan and Vlahu (2016) provide comprehensive reviews of the link between 
executive compensation of risk-taking in the financial industry.
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and idiosyncratic risk. Bai and Elyasiani (2013) find that higher sensitivity of CEO com-
pensation to stock return volatility induces risk-taking and leads to greater bank instability 
and higher levels of systematic as well as idiosyncratic risk. In contrast to Bai and Elya-
siani (2013), Bharati and Jia (2018) document a negative relationship between systematic 
risk and the risk-sensitivity of CEO compensation, and find no association between idi-
osyncratic risk and managerial risk-taking incentives. We aim to contribute to the prior 
literature by examining the effects of managerial risk-taking incentives on the systemic risk 
of financial institutions.
Systemic risk can broadly be defined as a measure of interdependencies between the 
risk-taking of individual financial institutions and the overall riskiness of the financial sys-
tem. Based on the prior literature about the effects of managerial compensation structures 
on bank risk-taking, we presume in this paper that managerial risk-taking incentives may 
influence the level of systemic risk. The risk-taking incentives generated by executive com-
pensation are generally designed to maximize shareholder value by decreasing managerial 
risk aversion so that the managers would undertake risky, value-enhancing investments.
As noted by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), among others, greater alignment of incen-
tives between executives and shareholders in the financial industry may create a conflict 
between shareholder orientation and financial stability. Given the moral hazard problems 
in the financial industry caused by the too-big-to-fail phenomenon, implicit and explicit 
government guarantees, and deposit insurance systems, shareholder-oriented managerial 
compensation arrangements might encourage bank executives to adopt more risky busi-
ness strategies and operations which, in turn, may lead to increased systemic risk.3 Because 
financial institutions and the executives of these institutions do not have to pay directly for 
the negative consequences of their excessive risk-taking, compensation-based managerial 
risk-taking incentives may not only increase the riskiness of an individual institution but 
also create negative externalities on the financial system by increasing the aggregate level 
of systemic risk. We therefore hypothesize that managerial risk-taking incentives are posi-
tively associated with the level of systemic risk.
In our empirical analysis, we use data on 71 large U.S. financial institutions over the 
period 2005–2010. Following the prior literature (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam 2010; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011; Bai and Elyasiani 2013; DeYoung et  al. 2013; Minhat and 
Abdullah 2016; Gande and Kalpathy 2017), we measure the risk-taking incentives of the 
CEOs and CFOs with the sensitivities of their personal compensation to changes in the 
stock price and stock return volatility of their institutions. These two compensation sensi-
tivities are commonly known as delta and vega. Delta is a relatively direct proxy for pay-
performance sensitivity and it provides a broad measure for how well top executive incen-
tives are aligned with shareholder interests (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011). As noted 
for example by Bai and Elyasiani (2013), vega provides an explicit measure of the risk-
sensitivity of executive compensation.
We measure the systemic risk of individual financial institutions with the market-based 
approach proposed by Acharya et al. (2012, 2017), and Brownlees and Engle (2017).4 Spe-
cifically, we use the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic risk (SRISK) to gauge 
3 Acharya (2009, 2011) provides a detailed discussion on how moral hazard problems and the too-big-to-
fail phenomenon may contribute to systemic risk.
4 Several alternative approaches for measuring systemic risk have been proposed in the literature in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis. Different approaches are discussed and compared, for instance, in 
Bisias et al. (2012), Hattori et al. (2014), Kleinow et al. (2017), and Grundke (2018).
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systemic risk. MES measures the decline of a financial institution’s equity capital when the 
market drops more than 2% and SRISK is the expected capital shortage of an institution 
during a financial crisis. Essentially, MES and SRISK aim to measure how exposed a given 
financial institution is to aggregate tail shocks in the financial system.
Our empirical findings indicate that the relationship between managerial risk-taking 
incentives and systemic risk is ambiguous. The results show that the sensitivities of top 
executive compensation to volatility (i.e., the CEO and CFO vegas) are generally nega-
tively associated with systemic risk, while the relation between pay-performance sensitiv-
ity (i.e., the delta) and systemic risk is essentially nonexistent. Our regressions indicate 
that one standard deviation increases in CEO and CFO vegas are associated with approxi-
mately 6% reductions in SRISK. These findings are in stark contrast with the hypothesis 
that greater managerial risk-taking incentives would increase the level of systemic risk. 
Nevertheless, the documented negative association between vegas and banks’ systemic risk 
is consistent with the alternative view is that compensation-based risk-taking incentives do 
not necessarily encourage risk-averse executives to increase firm risk-taking and may even 
induce executives to adopt less risky policies (e.g., Carpenter 2000; Ross 2004).
On the other hand, our empirical findings also demonstrate that the relationship between 
managerial risk-taking incentives and banks’ systemic risk is not stable over time. We 
find that financial institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associ-
ated with significantly higher levels of systemic risk in 2008 during the peak of the global 
financial crisis. The positive association between the pre-crisis deltas and vegas of the top 
executives and systemic risk during the crisis is economically significant; our estimates 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in deltas and vegas increases MES by about 
25–40 basis points during the crisis. The documented positive association between CEO 
and CFO risk-taking incentives and systemic risk during the severe market turmoil in 2008 
may indicate that financial institutions with greater compensation-based managerial risk-
taking incentives were taking more risk before the crisis in order to maximize shareholder 
wealth, and that these risks were then materialized and exposed during the financial cri-
sis. This interpretation of our results is broadly consistent with the previous studies which 
suggest that banks with more shareholder-focused corporate governance structures were 
taking more risk before the crisis (e.g., Fortin et  al. 2010; Erkens et  al. 2012; Peni and 
Vähämaa 2012).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
on managerial risk-taking incentives, the linkages between executive compensation and 
bank outcomes during the global financial crisis, and firm-specific attributes of systemic 
risk. Section 3 describes the data and introduces the variables used in our empirical analy-
sis. Section 4 presents the methods and reports our empirical findings on the association 
between managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions. 
Finally, the Sect. 5 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
2  Related literature
Our study builds upon several strands of research. In addition to the prior literature address-
ing the effects of managerial compensation structures on bank performance and risk-taking 
discussed in the introduction (e.g., Chen et al. 2006; DeYoung et al. 2013; Guo et al. 2015; 
Minhat and Abdullah 2016; Gande and Kalpathy 2017; Bharati and Jia 2018), our empiri-
cal analysis is closely related to three broad streams of research. First, we draw on the prior 
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literature examining the linkages between executive compensation policies and firm risk-
taking. Since the risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation are designed 
to decrease managerial risk aversion, it is not surprising that these risk-taking incentives 
have been abundantly documented to have a positive impact on the riskiness of non-finan-
cial firms (see e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Chava and Purnanandam 
2010; Armstrong and Vashishtha 2012; Alam et al. 2015).
Nevertheless, the less recognized alternative view is that compensation-based risk-tak-
ing incentives do not necessarily encourage risk-averse executives to increase firm risk-
taking and may even induce executives to adopt less risky policies (e.g., Carpenter 2000; 
Meulbroek 2001; Ross 2004; Hayes et  al. 2012). Although most empirical studies have 
linked higher managerial risk-taking incentives to higher stock return volatility and riskier 
corporate policies, many recent papers have documented a nonexistent or even a negative 
relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and firm risk-taking, and have also 
documented that risk averse executives may offset compensation-based risk-taking incen-
tives by adopting less risky financial policies (e.g., Serfling 2014; Bharati and Jia 2018; 
Doukas and Mandal 2018; Feng and Rao 2018; Chakraborty et al. 2018).
Despite the ample empirical literature on managerial risk-taking incentives in non-
financial firms, surprisingly little attention has so far been devoted to the compensation-
based risk-taking incentives in financial institutions. Banks and other financial institutions 
are fundamentally different from non-financial firms in terms of their business models, 
opaqueness, exposure to regulations and supervision, societal importance as well as ampli-
fied risk-taking incentives due to the implicit and explicit government guarantees and 
deposit insurance systems. Moreover, in contrast to non-financial firms, the additional reg-
ulatory oversight of financial institutions also encompasses their managerial compensation 
structures.5 Thus, more research is warranted on the implications of the managerial risk-
taking incentives in financial institutions.
Our study is closely related to the literature that examines linkages between execu-
tive compensation structures and bank outcomes during the global financial crisis of 
2008–2009. The prior studies by Bebchuk et al. (2010), Fortin et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz (2011), Bhagat and Bolton (2014), Minhat and Abdullah (2016), and Gande and 
Kalpathy (2017) provide somewhat mixed evidence about the effects of managerial com-
pensation incentives on bank performance and riskiness amidst the crisis. Bebchuk et al. 
(2010) investigate the compensation structures of the top executives in Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers, and conclude that the compensation arrangements in those banks may 
have provided excessive risk-taking incentives for the top executives. Fortin, Goldberg 
and Roth (2010) examine the determinants of bank risk-taking at the onset of the global 
financial crisis. Their empirical findings indicate that banks with higher CEO option-based 
compensation and bonuses were associated with greater risk-taking.
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) investigate the influence of CEO compensation on the 
stock returns and profitability of U.S. banks during the financial crisis. In contrast to the 
view that managerial compensation incentives encouraged excessive risk-taking, Fahl-
enbrach and Stulz (2011) document that option-based compensation incentives and cash 
bonuses were unrelated to bank performance during the crisis. Using data on 14 of the 
largest U.S. financial institutions, Bhagat and Bolton (2014) find evidence that the incen-
tives generated by executive compensation led to greater bank risk-taking and contributed 
5 The 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, for instance, stipulates 
enhanced oversight of executive compensation structures in financial institutions.
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to the outbreak of the financial crisis. Minhat and Abdullah (2016) document that manage-
rial risk-taking incentives induced by stock options are positively associated with banks’ 
stock return volatility and insolvency risk. However, their findings also demonstrate that 
the relation between risk-taking incentives and bank risk is not stable over time. Finally, 
Gande and Kalpathy (2017) document that CEO equity incentives before the global finan-
cial crisis are positively associated with the amount of Federal Reserve emergency loans 
banks obtained during the crisis.
Finally, our study complements the growing body of literature that examines how cer-
tain firm-specific attributes are related to the systemic risk of financial institutions. Studies 
by Brunnermeier et al. (2012), Pais and Stork (2013), Mayordomo et al. (2014), Calluzzo 
and Dong (2015), and Acharya and Thakor (2016), among others, have documented that 
the size of the institution, the amount of equity capital, and the extent of lending activities 
are important factors for explaining the cross-sectional variation in systemic risk. These 
studies indicate larger institutions with lower capital ratios and greater involvement in non-
traditional banking activities are associated with higher levels of systemic risk. Closely 
related to our analysis, Iqbal et al. (2015) and Battaglia and Gallo (2017) examine the rela-
tionship between shareholder-focused corporate governance structures and systemic risk. 
Their empirical findings suggest that financial institutions with more shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance mechanisms and boards of directors are associated with greater 
systemic risk. In this paper, we aim to extend the prior literature by examining the link-
age between systemic risk and the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top 
executives.
3  Data and variables
We use data on 71 large, publicly traded U.S. financial institutions spanning the period 
2005–2010. The data on CEO and CFO compensation, systemic risk, and financial state-
ment and balance sheet variables of the financial institutions are obtained from S&P Capi-
tal IQ’s ExecuComp, the V-Lab of the Stern School of Business of New York University, 
and the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope, respectively. Our initial sample consists of the 98 
financial institutions examined in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and we eliminate from this 
initial sample the institutions with missing or insufficient executive compensation and sys-
temic risk data on Execucomp and/or V-Lab. This leaves us with a sample of 71 individual 
financial institutions and an unbalanced panel of 332 firm-year observations.6 The sample 
includes commercial banks, investment banks, non-bank lending institutions, and finan-
cial services firms. The list of financial institutions included in the sample is presented in 
“Appendix 1”.
3.1  Systemic risk
Our dependent variable is the systemic risk of individual financial institutions. Systemic 
risk can be broadly defined as a measure of the relation of a particular financial institution’s 
6 Several recent studies have used relatively small samples of financial institutions (see e.g., Chen et  al. 
2006; Fortin et al. 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011; Adams and Mehran 2012; Peni and Vähämaa 2012; 
Peni et al. 2013; Mayordomo et al. 2014; Iqbal et al. 2015).
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risk-taking to the overall risk-taking in the financial industry. The systemic risk of an indi-
vidual financial institution can be regarded as the contribution of the institution to the 
downside risk of the entire financial system (Anginer et  al. 2014). The global financial 
crisis prompted considerable interest in the measurement of systemic risk and several alter-
native risk metrics have been proposed in the literature in recent years (for surveys, see 
e.g. Bisias et al. 2012 and Hattori et al. 2014). These alternative approaches to measuring 
systemic risk can be classified into accounting-based and market-based risk measures. The 
accounting-based systemic risk measures are estimated from balance sheet variables and 
are by construction backward-looking, while the market-based measures utilize financial 
market data and can thereby provide a timelier estimate of systemic risk.
In our empirical analysis, we apply the market-based approach developed by Acharya 
et al. (2012, 2017), and Brownlees and Engle (2017) to gauge systemic risk. Specifically, 
we utilize the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic risk (SRISK) obtained from 
the NYU Stern’s V-Lab to measure the systemic risk of individual financial institutions. 
These two systemic risk metrics are estimated from stock market data and attempt to cap-
ture the capital shortfall of an institution during periods of market stress based on its stock 
return volatility and correlation with the market. Essentially, MES and SRISK measure how 
exposed a given financial institution is to aggregate tail shocks in the stock markets. We 
use the year-end (December) estimates of MES and SRISK as the dependent variable in our 
analysis.
SRISK can be defined as the amount of “capital that a firm is expected to need if we 
have another financial crisis” (Acharya et al. 2012). Formally, SRISK for a financial institu-
tion i at time t can be expressed as:
Capital Shortfall in Eq. (1) is determined under the assumption that the book value of debt 
of a financial institution would remain relatively unchanged if a crisis occurred within the 
next 6 months whereas the value of equity would decline. The computation of SRISK is 
based on MES which measures the expected loss of equity capital during periods of mar-
ket stress. MES can be broadly interpreted as the marginal contribution of an individual 
financial institution to the overall systemic risk, with higher MES reflecting a greater con-
tribution of the institution to the aggregate level of systemic risk. If a financial institution 
has high levels of MES, most of the institution’s equity capital will be depleted during a 
financial crisis, and hence, the institution will be in danger of failure. This also implies that 
undercapitalization of financial institutions contributes positively to the overall systemic 
risk in the financial system (Brownlees and Engle 2017).
Acharya et al. (2012) define MES as the expected daily percentage decrease in the value 
of equity of an individual financial institution when the aggregate stock market declines by 
more than 2%. By extrapolating MES to a longer and more severe period of market stress, 
Acharya et al. (2012) obtain the long run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) which can 
be approximated as:
Based on LRMES, Acharya et al. (2012) estimate SRISK of financial institution i at time t 
as follows:
(1)SRISKi,t = Ei,t
(
Capital Shortfalli|Crisis
)
(2)LRMESi,t = 1 − exp
(
−18 ×MESi,t
)
(3)SRISKi,t = Ei,t
[
k
(
Debti,t + Equityi,t
)
− Equityi,t|Crisis
]
(4)SRISKi,t = k
(
Debti,t
)
− (1 − k)
(
1 − LRMESi,t
)
Equityi,t
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where k denotes the prudential capital ratio which is taken to be 8%, LRMES is the long 
run marginal expected shortfall, Equity is the market value of equity, and Debt is the mar-
ket value of debt. Hence, SRISK is the amount of equity capital needed by a financial insti-
tution in a severe crisis in which the current equity value falls according to the LRMES and 
the level of debt stays constant.
MES and SRISK are estimated from historical stock price data. First, MES, or the 
expected daily decrease in equity value of a financial institution when the aggregate stock 
markets declines by more than 2% is calculated based on the institution’s stock return vola-
tility, correlation with the aggregate market, and extreme stock price movements. Then, 
these MES estimates are extrapolated to a financial crisis. Based on these extrapolated 
decreases in equity value, and under the assumption that a financial institution needs at 
least 8% of equity capital relative to the value of assets, SRISK is computed as the expected 
amount of equity capital that the institution would need to raise during a severe financial 
crisis. A more detailed description of the estimation of MES and SRISK can be found in 
Acharya et al. (2012, 2017), and Brownlees and Engle (2017).
3.2  CEO and CFO risk‑taking incentives
The main independent variables in our empirical analysis are measures of risk-taking 
incentives generated by executive compensation. Following the prior literature on compen-
sation-based incentives (see e.g., Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
2011; Kini and Williams 2012; Shaw 2012; DeYoung et al. 2013; Minhat and Abdullah 
2016; Gande and Kalpathy 2017; Hu and Jiang 2018; Yung and Chen 2018), we meas-
ure the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs and CFOs with the sensitivities of their per-
sonal compensation to changes in the stock price and stock return volatility of their insti-
tutions. More specifically, we utilize the delta and vega of the stock option holdings of 
individual executives as proxies for the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the 
top executives.
CEO delta and CFO delta measure the dollar gain or loss in personal executive wealth 
for a 1% change in the stock price of the financial institution. Consequently, delta is a rela-
tively direct proxy for pay-performance sensitivity and it provides a broad measure of how 
well managerial incentives are aligned with shareholder interests (e.g., Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz 2011). The delta also provides an indirect measure of managerial risk-taking incen-
tives because in order to increase shareholder wealth and their own compensation, the top 
executives are incentivized to take risks that ultimately increase the overall risk exposure 
of the firm (Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Kini and Williams 2012). CEO vega and CFO 
vega measure the dollar gain or loss in personal executive wealth for a 1% point change in 
the stock return volatility of the financial institution. As discussed by Bai and Elyasiani 
(2013), vega is an explicit measure of risk-sensitivity of executive compensation, and 
thereby it provides a direct proxy for the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the 
top executives.
We follow the approach of Core and Guay (2002) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
to calculate the deltas and vegas for the top executives in each financial institution. Spe-
cifically, we collect data on the components of CEO and CFO compensation from 
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ExecuComp.7 The deltas and vegas are calculated based on the Black–Scholes option 
valuation model using detailed information on fiscal year-end outstanding option grants 
awarded to the CEOs and CFOs.8 For each option grant, we obtain the strike prices and 
expiration dates from ExecuComp. We use the fiscal year-end stock price and stock return 
volatility over the previous 3 years as the Black–Scholes inputs for stock price and volatil-
ity, and the 10-year Treasury rate is used as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate. With 
these inputs, the deltas and vegas can be computed as the first partial derivatives of the 
Black–Scholes model with respect to stock price and volatility, respectively. By aggregat-
ing the deltas and vegas on each option grant for each executive, we are able to measure 
the changes in personal executive wealth associated with changes in stock price and stock 
return volatility.
3.3  Control variables
We employ a number of control variables in our empirical analysis to account for the 
potentially confounding effects of institution-specific factors on the level of systemic risk. 
Previous studies have documented that the riskiness of financial institutions is related to 
variables such as size, capital ratio, profitability, growth, and asset and income structure 
(see e.g., Pathan 2009; Fortin et  al. 2010; Brunnermeier et  al. 2012; Bai and Elyasiani 
2013; Iqbal et al. 2015; Akhigbe et al. 2016; Berger et al. 2016; Ahmed et al. 2019).
Firm size is often considered the most important control variable when comparing 
financial institutions because different sized organizations may have very different char-
acteristics, business strategies, governance mechanisms, and product compositions (Peni 
et al. 2013; Palvia et al. 2015). Moreover, larger institutions are likely to have greater sys-
temic importance. Following the prior banking literature (e.g., Laeven and Levine 2009; 
DeYoung et al. 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli 2013; Akhigbe et al. 2016), we measure the size 
of the financial institutions (Size) by the natural logarithm of total assets. With respect to 
systemic risk, Brunnermeier et al. (2012), Pais and Stork (2013), and Iqbal et al. (2015) 
document that larger financial institutions are associated with higher levels of systemic 
risk, while Mayordomo et al. (2014) do not find any significant relation between systemic 
risk and bank size.
The second important variable that needs to be controlled for when comparing finan-
cial institutions is the amount of equity capital. The capital ratio is the main variable of 
interest for banking supervisors and regulators. The amount of equity capital is the pre-
dominant factor in reducing insolvency risk and capital ratio can be considered as a proxy 
for the soundness and financial health of the institution. We measure Capital ratio as the 
ratio of equity capital to total assets. Brownlees and Engle (2017) posit that the degree of 
undercapitalization of financial institutions reflects the level of systemic risk in the entire 
financial system. Moreover, Acharya and Thakor (2016), Brunnermeier et al. (2012), and 
7 To ensure that we have the correct CEOs and especially CFOs, we manually match the names of the 
CEOs and CFOs from the proxy statements of the financial institutions.
8 In 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FAS 123R and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted new disclosure requirements for executive compensation that require 
firms to report detailed information on the compensation of at least five highest-paid executives. Given 
these disclosure requirements, firms have to report outstanding equity awards at fiscal year-end by providing 
detailed information about outstanding option grants, including the exercise prices and expiration dates of 
the options.
1238 J. Iqbal, S. Vähämaa 
1 3
Mayordomo et  al. (2014) have documented that capital ratio is an important factor for 
explaining the systemic risk of individual financial institutions.
Furthermore, following the prior bank risk-taking literature, we control for the financial 
performance, growth, and asset and income structure of the financial institutions. We meas-
ure profitability of the institutions with Return on assets which is computed as the ratio of 
net income to total assets. Profitability can be seen as a crude proxy of management qual-
ity and more profitable institutions may be in better positions to build capital buffers and 
to reduce systemic risk. Previous studies have documented a negative association between 
profitability and systemic risk (Iqbal et al. 2015; Berger et al. 2016). We use the annual 
percentage change in the amount of outstanding loans as a proxy for the growth of the 
institutions (Growth). The growth rate is an important determinant of the riskiness of finan-
cial institutions (Foos et al. 2010). We utilize the ratio of net loans to total assets (Loans to 
assets) and total deposits divided by total assets (Deposits to assets) to control for the asset 
and liability structures of the financial institutions. These variables reflect the lending and 
funding risks of the institutions. Finally, we use the ratio of non-interest income to total 
income (Non-interest income) to control for the level of income diversification and the dif-
ferences in business models across institutions. The balance sheet and income statement 
data for our control variables are collected from the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope.
4  Empirical analysis
4.1  Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. 
The table illustrates that the financial institutions in our sample are very heterogeneous in 
terms of the compensation-based risk-taking incentives of their top executives. CEO delta 
takes values from a minimum of about USD 700 to a maximum of USD 53.1 million, while 
CFO delta takes varies between USD 50 and USD 38.2 million. The mean CEO delta of 
USD 1.6 million is about four times larger than the mean CFO delta of USD 400,000, 
and also the mean CEO vega of USD 320,000 is approximately four-fold compared to the 
mean CFO vega of USD 81,000. The mean and median values of the CEO deltas and vegas 
over the sample period are plotted in Fig. 1. Regarding the systemic risk measures, Table 1 
shows that our sample contains financial institutions associated with very different levels 
of systemic risk. MES varies from a minimum of 0.8% to a maximum of 8.7% with a mean 
of 2.5%, while SRISK ranges from − 67.7 billion to 136.5 billion with a mean value of 4.1 
billion USD. 
The descriptive statistics for the control variables in Table 1 demonstrate that our sam-
ple comprises very divergent types of financial institutions. Although all firms in our sam-
ple are large, publicly traded financial institutions, the amount of total assets (Size) varies 
substantially from about USD 540 million to USD 3.2 trillion. The inclusion of commercial 
banks as well as other types of financial institutions (investment banks, non-bank lending 
institutions, and financial services firms) in our sample is manifested in the considerable 
variation of the asset and income structure variables (Loans to assets, Deposits to assets, 
and Non-interest income). Overall, it can be concluded from the descriptive statistics that 
our empirical analysis is based on a heterogeneous sample of financial institutions.
Pairwise correlations between the two systemic risk measures, managerial risk-taking 
incentives, and the control variables are presented in Table  2. The negative correlations 
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between the systemic risk measures and the deltas and vegas of the top executives suggest 
that financial institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives are generally asso-
ciated with lower levels of systemic risk. The correlations in Table 2 also demonstrate that 
MES and SRISK are strongly positively correlated with each other (0.48), and furthermore, 
that the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs and CFOs are strongly positively correlated.9 
Given the relatively high correlations between CEO delta and CFO delta (0.45) and espe-
cially CEO vega and CFO vega (0.83), we estimate separate regression models for CEO 
and CFO risk-taking incentives.
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample consists of 71 publicly traded U.S. 
financial institutions. Systemic risk is measured with the following two variables: (1) Marginal expected 
shortfall (MES) is the expected daily percentage decrease in equity value of a financial institution when 
the aggregate stock market falls more than 2% and (2) Systemic risk (SRISK) is the expected capital short-
fall (in $ billions) of a financial institution in a crisis scenario. Managerial Incentives (in $ thousands) are 
defined as: Delta is the sensitivity of manager’s portfolio to stock price and measures the dollar gain or loss 
in manager’s wealth if the firm’s stock price changes and Vega is the sensitivity of manager’s portfolio to 
changes in equity volatility. The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the total assets 
(in $ billions), Capital ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income 
to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change 
in loans from year t − 1 to year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest 
income is the ratio of non-interest income to total income
Variable Mean Median St.dev. Min Max P25 P75 No. of obs
Dependent variables
Marginal expected 
shortfall (%)
2.51 2.34 1.10 0.84 8.65 1.66 3.11 332
Systemic risk ($ 
billions)
4.10 − 0.44 20.90 − 67.66 136.47 − 1.83 2.33 332
Managerial risk-taking incentives
CEO delta ($ thou-
sands)
1642.42 526.56 4735.40 0.69 53,121.09 181.33 1621.78 336
CEO vega ($ thou-
sands)
320.14 154.90 476.14 1.59E − 25 3032.25 34.79 424.24 347
CFO delta ($ thou-
sands)
403.64 61.60 3051.02 0.05 38,202.76 22.48 166.82 285
CFO vega ($ thou-
sands)
80.92 31.65 135.91 7.73E − 14 859.53 9.07 94.35 285
Control variables
Size 257.41 57.21 481.59 0.54 3221.97 15.94 193.32 367
Capital ratio 12.68 9.88 13.73 − 3.60 90.51 7.91 12.02 367
Return on assets 1.12 0.97 3.08 − 18.42 22.57 0.46 1.39 367
Loans to assets 50.70 60.26 24.63 0.00 90.74 34.83 69.50 338
Loan growth 14.64 6.99 58.46 − 72.26 704.49 − 1.47 17.10 310
Deposits to assets 61.77 69.43 24.27 0.05 89.95 50.07 80.20 362
Non-interest income 49.94 43.58 31.55 − 76.02 175.13 30.02 74.15 367
9 We conduct additional tests to ensure that our findings are not affected by the strong correlations between 
the deltas and vegas.
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With respect to the control variables, it can be noted from Table 2 that the risk-taking 
incentives of the CEOs and CFOs as well as the two systemic risk measures are positively 
correlated with the Size. Hence, these correlations indicate that larger financial institutions 
are associated with higher levels of systemic risk and that the top executives of larger insti-
tutions have stronger personal incentives to increase firm-level risk-taking. Our systemic 
risk measures MES and SRISK also appear to be strongly negatively correlated with Return 
on assets and Loans to assets. Finally, it is worth noting from Table 2 that several of our 
control variables are relatively highly correlated with each other.10 The strongest correla-
tions observed among the control variables are those between Capital ratio and Return on 
assets (0.55) and Loans to assets and Non-interest income (− 0.65).
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
2,400
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mean CEO Delta Mean CEO Vega
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Median CEO Delta Median CEO Vega
Fig. 1  CEO deltas and vegas. The figures plot the mean and median values of CEO Delta and CEO Vega
10 Given these correlations, we perform several robustness checks to ascertain that our results are not 
affected by multicollinearity.
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4.2  Univariate tests
We first examine the relationship between managerial risk-incentives and systemic risk in 
a univariate setting. For this purpose, we divide the financial institutions into two subsam-
ples based on the level of systemic risk. The first subsample consists of firm-year observa-
tions with MES in the top quartile (high systemic risk) and the second subsample com-
prises firm-year observations with MES in the bottom quartile (low systemic risk). Table 3 
reports the results of two-tailed t-tests with the null hypothesis that there are no differences 
in the means of the top executive deltas and vegas and the control variables between the 
high and low systemic risk subsamples.11 Interestingly, the t-tests indicate that there are no 
statistically significant differences in the CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives between the 
financial institutions associated with high and low systemic risk. Thus, in contrast to our 
Table 3  Univariate tests
The table reports the results of two-tailed t-tests under the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the 
means between financial institutions having higher level of systemic risk and financial institutions having 
lower level of systemic risk. We divide our sample into two subsamples. The first subsample contains the 
financial institutions with higher level of systemic risk (financial institutions having systemic risk values 
in 3rd quartile) and the second subsample contains institutions with lower level of systemic risk (financial 
institutions having systemic risk values in 1st quartile). Marginal Expected Shortfall is the expected daily 
decrease in equity value of a financial institution when the aggregate stock market falls more than 2%, Sys-
temic Risk is the expected capital shortfall (measured in billion dollars) of a financial institution in a crisis 
scenario, Delta is the sensitivity of a manager’s portfolio to stock price and measures the dollar gain or 
loss in manager’s wealth if the firm’s stock price changes and Vega is the sensitivity of manager’s portfolio 
to changes in equity volatility, Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Capital ratio is the ratio 
of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans-to-assets is the 
ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t − 1 to year t, 
Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest 
income to total income
***, **, and *Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
High systemic risk Low systemic risk Difference in means t-stat
Risk-taking incentives
CEO delta 6.086 6.122 − 0.036 − 0.19
CEO vega 5.502 5.623 − 0.121 − 1.22
CFO delta 5.326 5.269 0.057 0.65
CFO vega 5.038 5.051 − 0.013 − 0.22
Control variables
Size 18.155 17.499 0.657 3.17***
Capital ratio 16.078 10.129 5.950 3.71***
Return on assets 1.230 0.998 0.231 0.65
Loans to assets 40.314 59.512 − 19.198 − 6.98***
Loan growth 15.773 9.640 6.132 0.95 
Depostis to assets 93.477 97.697 − 4.220 − 4.63***
Non-interest income 61.886 37.960 23.926 7.43***
11 We also perform the Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney median tests to examine differences between the high 
and low systemic risk subsamples. The results are consistent with the t-tests reported in Table 3.
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expectations, the univariate tests do not provide support for the view that greater manage-
rial risk-taking incentives would contribute positively to the level of systemic risk.
Regarding the control variables, it can be noted from Table  3 that the high systemic 
risk institutions are very different from the low systemic risk institutions. Specifically, the 
univariate tests show that financial institutions associated with higher systemic risk are sig-
nificantly larger and have higher capital ratios. Moreover, the statistically significant dif-
ferences between the two subsamples in terms of Loans to assets, Deposits to assets, and 
Non-interest income suggest that the high systemic risk institutions are more involved in 
non-traditional banking activities.
4.3  Regression results
We examine the association between managerial risk-taking incentives and systemic by 
estimating alternative versions of the following panel regressions specification:
where the dependent variable Riski,t is one of the two alternative systemic risk measures 
for financial institution i at time t. The first risk measure is the marginal expected short-
fall, MES, calculated as the expected daily decrease in equity value of a financial insti-
tution when the aggregate stock market falls more than 2%. The second risk measure is 
systemic risk, SRISK, defined as the expected capital shortfall of a financial institution in 
a crisis scenario. Delta and Vega measure the compensation-based risk-taking incentives 
of the CEOs and CFOs. Delta is the sensitivity of executive compensation to changes in 
stock price, while Vega is the sensitivity of executive compensation to changes in stock 
return volatility. In the regressions, we use natural logarithms of MES, SRISK, Delta, and 
Vega. Given the high correlations between CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives, we do 
not include the deltas and vegas of the CEOs and CFOs simultaneously in the regressions. 
In addition to the baseline specification, we also estimate modified versions of Eq. (5) in 
which we interact the deltas and vegas with a dummy variable for year 2008. With these 
additional specifications, we aim to assess the potential effects of the financial crisis on the 
relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and systemic risk.
The control variables in Eq.  (5) are defined as follows: Size is measured as the loga-
rithm of total assets, Capital ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets 
is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net loans to totals 
assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t – 1 to year t, Deposits to 
assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-
interest income to total income. Following the prior literature, all the independent vari-
ables are lagged by 1 year. Our regressions include year fixed-effects (Year) to control for 
time-specific unobservable factors which may influence systemic risk and we also include 
bank-type fixed-effects (Bank-type) for different types of financial institutions based on SIC 
codes to control for potentially omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity. Through-
out the regressions, we use robust standard errors which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(5)
Riski,t = 훼 + 훽1Deltai,t−1 + 훽2Vegai,t−1 + 훽3Sizei,t−1 + 훽4Capital ratioi,t−1
+ 훽5Return on assetsi,t−1 + 훽6Loans to assetsi,t−1 + 훽7Loan growthi,t−1
+ 훽8Deposits to assetsi,t−1 + 훽9Non−interest incomei,t−1
+
n−1∑
k=1
훼kBank−type
k
i
+
2010∑
y=2006
휔yYear
y
i
+ 휀i,t
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and clustered by firm to account for the potential correlation across observations of the 
same financial institution over time.
The regression results with marginal expected shortfall, MES, as the dependent variable 
are reported in Table 4. CEO risk-taking incentives are used as the independent variables 
of interest in Models 1–3 and CFO incentives in Models 4–6. For both CEO and CFO 
risk-taking incentives, we first estimate the regressions by including Delta and Vega in the 
same regression with all of the control variables (Models 1 and 4). We then estimate four 
alternative interaction specifications in which the CEO and CFO deltas are interacted with 
a dummy variable for the crisis year 2008 (Models 2 and 5) and in which the CEO and 
CFO vegas are interacted with the same dummy (Models 3 and 6). As can be seen from 
Table 4, the adjusted R2s of our alternative regression specifications vary between 64 and 
72% and the F-statistics are all statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating a good fit 
of the models.12
The main variables of interest in our regressions are Delta and Vega and the two inter-
action variables Delta × Year2008 and Vega × Year2008. As can be noted from Table 4, the 
coefficient estimates for CEO delta and CEO vega in Model 1 are statistically insignifi-
cant, suggesting that MES is not affected by CEO risk-taking incentives. However, after the 
inclusion of the crisis interactions in Models 2 and 3, the coefficient estimate for CEO vega 
is negative and statistically significant and the coefficients for the both interaction variables 
CEO delta × Year2008 and CEO vega × Year2008 are positive and highly significant. Accord-
ingly, our estimates indicate that financial institutions led by CEOs with greater compen-
sation-based risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher MES in the 
midst of the global financial crisis in 2008.
In Models 4–6 with CFO risk-taking incentives as the variables of interest, the coeffi-
cients for CFO delta are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that MES is lower 
for institutions with greater CFO pay-performance sensitivity. This finding is inconsist-
ent with the view that compensation-based managerial incentives encourage greater risk-
taking. Nevertheless, similar to the CEO incentive regressions, the coefficient estimates 
for both interaction variables CFO delta × Year2008 and CFO vega × Year2008 are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level in Models 5 and 6. Since delta and vega are 
proxies of managerial risk-taking incentives, the interaction regressions in Table 4 suggest 
that financial institutions with greater compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top 
executives at the onset of the financial crisis were associated with higher levels of systemic 
risk during the severe financial market turmoil in 2008.
In addition to being statistically significant, the coefficients for the interaction variables 
in Table  4 can also be considered economically significant. The coefficient estimate for 
CEO delta × Year2008 in Model 2 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the pre-
crisis CEO delta would be associated with a 30 basis point increase in MES in the year 
2008. Similarly, the magnitudes of the statistically significant coefficients for CEO vega 
and CEO vega × Year2008 in Model 3 jointly imply that a one standard deviation increase 
in pre-crisis vega of the CEO increases MES by approximately 40 basis points during the 
financial crisis. Consistent with Models 2 and 3, the estimates for the CFO risk-taking 
incentives in Models 5 and 6 indicate that one standard deviation increases in CFO delta 
and CFO vega are associated with about 25 basis point increase in MES amidst the crisis. 
Given that the average book value of equity for the financial institutions in our sample is 
12 The adjusted R2 is 26% when only the control variables are used as the independent variables. After the 
inclusion of bank-type and year fixed-effects, the adjusted R2 is about 58%.
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Table 5  Managerial risk-taking incentives and systemic risk (SRISK)
The table reports the estimates of six alternative versions of the following panel regression specifica-
tion: SRISKi,t = 훼0 + 훽1Incentivesi,t−1 + 훽2Sizei,t−1 + 훽3Capital ratioi,t−1 + 훽4Return on assetsi,t−1
+훽5Loans to assetsi,t−1 + 훽6Loan growthi,t−1 + 훽7Deposits to assetsi,t−1 + 훽8Non−interest incomei,t−1 +
n−1∑
k=1
훼k
Bank−typek
i
+
2010∑
y=2006
휔yYear
y
i
+ 휀i,t
where the dependent variable SRISKi,t is the systemic risk for firm i at time t calculated as the is the 
expected capital shortfall in a crisis scenario. Incentivesj,t is either the Delta which is the sensitivity of a 
manager’s portfolio to stock price and measures the dollar gain or loss in manager’s wealth if the firm’s 
stock price changes or Vega which is the sensitivity of manager’s portfolio to changes in equity volatility. 
The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Capital ratio 
is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets 
is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t – 1 to 
year t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-
interest income to total income. Bank−typek
i
 is a dummy variable for type of financial institution i and Yeary
i
 
is a dummy variable for fiscal years. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard 
errors which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering
***, **, and *Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
Variable CEO incentives CFO incentives
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Risk-taking incentives
Delta 0.002
(0.16)
− 0.028***
(− 2.98)
0.011
(0.53)
− 0.067**
(− 2.25)
Delta × Year2008 0.035***
(2.55)
0.128***
(2.49)
Vega − 0.072***
(− 2.54)
− 0.098***
(− 3.33)
− 0.124***
(− 2.66)
− 0.144***
(− 4.06)
Vega × Year2008 0.107***
(2.51)
0.171**
(2.45)
Control variables
Size 0.060***
(4.67)
0.045***
(3.46)
0.061***
(5.02)
0.080***
(4.87)
0.067***
(4.16)
0.077***
(4.84)
Capital ratio − 0.001
(− 0.15)
− 0.002
(− 0.51)
− 0.002
(− 0.59)
0.003
(0.52)
0.003
(0.53)
0.002
(0.46)
Return on assets − 0.020*
(− 1.80)
− 0.024*
(− 1.75)
− 0.020*
(− 1.63)
− 0.014
(− 1.17)
− 0.017
(− 1.19)
− 0.012
(− 0.99)
Loans to assets − 0.001*
(− 1.66)
− 0.002*
(− 1.63)
− 0.002*
(− 1.68)
− 0.002*
(− 1.90)
− 0.002*
(− 1.82)
− 0.002*
(− 1.91)
Loan growth 0.000
(− 0.87)
0.000
(0.93)
0.000*
(1.80)
0.000
(1.20)
0.000
(0.72)
0.000*
(1.81)
Deposits to assets 0.253
(0.54)
0.152
(0.38)
0.405
(0.81)
1.059
(1.40)
0.974
(1.24)
1.106
(1.42)
Non-interest income − 0.001**
(− 2.28)
− 0.002***
(− 2.61)
− 0.001**
(− 2.19)
− 0.002***
(− 2.60)
− 0.002***
(− 2.65)
− 0.002***
(− 2.58)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 33.54% 30.54% 41.02% 53.49% 52.24% 56.82%
F-stat. 7.47*** 6.63*** 10.17*** 14.03*** 13.4*** 15.91***
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about USD 16 billion, these 25–40 basis point increases in MES are economically highly 
significant.
With respect to the control variables, the regression results in Table 4 show that sys-
temic risk as measured by MES is statistically significantly positively associated with Size 
and Non-interest income and negatively associated with Return on assets. Thus, our esti-
mates suggest that larger financial institutions which are more involved in non-traditional 
banking activities and institutions with weaker financial performance are associated with 
higher levels of systemic risk.
Table 5 reports the regression results with systemic risk, SRISK, as the dependent vari-
able. Similar to Table 4, CEO risk-taking incentives are used as the independent variables 
of interest in Models 1–3, while CFO incentives are used in Models 4–6. As can be noted 
from Table 5, the F-statistics for all six model specifications are statistically significant at 
the 1% level and the adjusted R2s of the estimated regressions range from 31 to 57%.
Overall, the estimates of the SRISK regressions in Table 5 are very similar to the MES 
regressions reported in Table  4. The most notable differences between the two sets of 
results are the statistically significant coefficients for CEO vega in Model 1 and CFO vega 
in Model 4. These negative and highly significant coefficients indicate that financial institu-
tions with greater risk-sensitivities of the top executives are generally associated with lower 
levels of systemic risk. The coefficient estimates indicate that a 10% increase in CEO vega 
would decrease SRISK by 0.7%, while a corresponding increase in CFO vega is associ-
ated with a 1.2% decrease in SRISK. Furthermore, one standard deviation increases in CEO 
vega and CFO vega would decrease SRISK by approximately 6.0%. The average SRISK 
for the institutions included in our sample is about USD 4.1 billion, and therefore, these 
reductions in SRISK can be considered economically significant. The documented negative 
linkage between CEO and CFO vegas and SRISK contrasts with the hypothesis that higher 
managerial risk-taking incentives would contribute positively to the level of systemic risk. 
Consistent with the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), this negative association 
between vegas and systemic risk may suggest that the top executives of financial institu-
tions tend to be risk averse.
Similar to Table 4, the coefficient estimates for the interaction variables Delta × Year2008 
and Vega × Year2008 are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all four inter-
action regressions. Thus, consistent with our MES regressions, the regressions in Table 5 
suggest that financial institutions with greater risk-taking incentives of the top executives 
prior the financial crisis were associated with higher levels of systemic risk during the cri-
sis. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that the positive association 
between managerial risk-taking incentives and SRISK in the midst of the financial crisis 
is rather marginal. The estimates of Models 2 and 3 imply that a 10% increase in pre-
crisis CEO delta and CEO vega would increase SRISK by less than 0.10% during the finan-
cial crisis. With respect to CFO incentives, the estimates of Model 5 and 6 suggest that 
10% increases (one standard deviation increases) in pre-crisis CFO delta and CFO vega 
are associated with 0.6% (4.7%) and 0.3% (1.4%) increases in SRISK, respectively. With 
average SRISK of about USD 4.1 billion, these increases in SRISK during the crisis can be 
considered economically significant.
The coefficient estimates for the control variables in Table 5 indicate that systemic risk 
is significantly negatively related to Return on assets, Loans to assets, and Non-interest 
income, while being positively associated with Size. This suggests that systemically more 
risky financial institutions are larger and have lower profitability, lower amounts of out-
standing loans, and less income diversification.
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In general, the regression results reported in Tables  4 and 5 provide mixed evidence 
about the linkage between top executive risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of 
financial institutions. Specifically, our findings indicate that the relationship between mana-
gerial risk-taking incentives and banks’ systemic risk is not stable over time. On the one 
hand, our results indicate that the sensitivities of CEO and CFO compensation to stock 
return volatility are negatively associated with the systemic risk of financial institutions 
over our sample period 2005–2010. This finding is in stark contrast with the hypothesis 
that higher managerial risk-taking incentives would increase the level of systemic risk. 
Nevertheless, the documented negative association between vegas and banks’ systemic risk 
is consistent with the less recognized alternative view that compensation-based risk-taking 
incentives may induce risk-averse executives to adopt less risky policies (e.g., Carpenter 
2000; Meulbroek 2001; Ross 2004; Hayes et al. 2012). On the other hand, our regressions 
also demonstrate that financial institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives 
were associated with significantly higher levels of MES and SRISK in the midst of the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Taken as a whole, the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 together 
with the univariate tests in Table 3 do not generally provide support for the view that the 
risk-taking incentives of the top executives contribute positively to the level of systemic 
risk.
4.4  Additional tests
We perform several additional tests to investigate the robustness of our findings. Given 
that managerial risk-aversion may obviously influence the relation between CEO and CFO 
vegas and systemic risk, we first aim to control for the level of executive risk aversion. Fol-
lowing Guay (1999), Coles et al. (2006), DeYoung et al. (2013), and Croci and Petmezas 
(2015), we use executives’ cash compensation as a proxy for managerial risk-aversion. The 
prior studies posit that executives with higher total cash compensation are less risk averse. 
Thus, we estimate regressions with the logarithm of the sum of executive salaries and cash 
bonuses as an additional control variable. The estimates of these regressions are reported 
in Table 6. Consistent with our main results, the coefficient estimates for CEO vega and 
CFO vega are negative and statistically highly significant in 10 out of 12 alternative speci-
fications, and the coefficients for the interaction variables Vega × Year2008 are positive and 
statistically significant in all four interaction regressions. Thus, we conclude that our main 
findings are robust to the inclusion of a proxy for managerial risk-aversion. The estimated 
coefficients for CFO cash compensation are positive and statistically significant in the 
regressions with SRISK as the dependent variable, suggesting that institutions with higher 
CFO cash compensation are associated with greater risk-taking.
Second, we acknowledge that SRISK is dominated by the size of the institution, and 
moreover, that our managerial risk-taking incentive variables are strongly positively cor-
related with institution size. To further examine the robustness of our findings, we scale 
SRISK by total assets and re-estimate the regressions tabulated in Table 5 with SRISK as 
the dependent variable. The results of these additional regressions are reported in Table 7. 
As can be noted from the table, the coefficient estimates for CEO vega and CFO vega are 
negative and statistically significant. Nevertheless, in contrast to our main SRISK regres-
sions reported in Table 5, the coefficients for the interaction variables Delta × Year2008 and 
Vega × Year2008 are insignificant with the only exception being the positive coefficient esti-
mate for CEO vega × Year2008 in Model 3. Overall, the additional regressions in Table 7 
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Table 6  Managerial risk-taking incentives, managerial risk-aversion, and systemic risk
The table reports the estimates of six alternative regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the mar-
ginal expected shortfall (MESi,t) for firm i at time t calculated as the expected daily percentage decrease in 
equity value of a financial institution when the aggregate stock market falls more than 2%. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is the systemic risk (SRISKi,t) for firm i at time t calculated as the is the expected capital 
shortfall in a crisis scenario. Managerial risk-taking incentives are measured with Delta which is the sen-
sitivity of a manager’s portfolio to stock price and measures the dollar gain or loss in manager’s wealth if 
the firm’s stock price changes and Vega which is the sensitivity of manager’s portfolio to changes in equity 
volatility. Managerial risk-aversion is proxied by executives’ cash compensation. The control variables are 
defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Capital ratio is the ratio of equity to 
total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets is the ratio of net 
loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t − 1 to year t, Deposits to 
assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-interest income to 
total income. Bank − typek
i
 is a dummy variable for type of financial institution i and Yeary
i
 is a dummy vari-
able for fiscal years. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors which are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering
***, **, and *Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
Variable CEO incentives CFO incentives
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Panel A: Marginal expected shortfall (MES) regressions
Delta − 0.013*
(− 1.72)
− 0.072**
(− 2.10)
Vega − 0.018
(− 1.14)
− 0.039***
(− 2.97)
− 0.060**
(− 2.55)
− 0.009
(− 0.14)
− 0.082**
(− 2.15)
− 0.118**
(− 2.11)
Vega × Year2008 0.109***
(5.20)
0.201***
(5.97)
Managerial risk-
aversion
− 0.018
(− 1.48)
− 0.014
(− 1.01)
− 0.013
(− 0.92)
0.039
(1.11)
0.039
(1.13)
0.044
(1.14)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 72.00% 73.06% 73.87% 67.29% 66.76% 67.76%
F-stat. 28.43*** 33.05*** 32.27*** 19.8*** 20.76*** 20.23***
Panel B: Systemic risk (SRISK) regressions
Delta 0.002
(0.51)
0.010
(0.58)
Vega − 0.078***
(− 4.06)
− 0.083***
(− 5.48)
− 0.103***
(− 6.29)
− 0.134***
(− 11.21)
− 0.124***
(− 5.73)
− 0.157***
(− 10.29)
Vega × Year2008 0.104***
(3.92)
0.182***
(16.26)
Managerial risk-
aversion
− 0.019
(− 0.91)
− 0.016
(− 0.76)
− 0.015
(− 0.70)
0.053**
(2.38)
0.053**
(2.28)
0.058**
(2.32)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 40.10% 43.44% 46.28% 59.79% 59.74% 63.19%
F-stat. 7.4*** 9.36*** 9.83*** 14.31*** 15.33*** 16.52***
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provide further evidence that the sensitivities of CEO and CFO compensation to stock 
return volatility are negatively associated with systemic risk.
Third, in order to ensure that the high correlations between the managerial risk-taking 
incentive variables do not affect our results, we re-estimate Models 1 and 4 in Tables 4 and 
5 using only one incentive variable at a time (results not tabulated). Similar to Model 1 in 
Table 4, the coefficients for CEO delta and CEO vega with MES as the dependent vari-
able are statistically insignificant even when these variables are not used simultaneously 
in the regression. In contrast to our main analysis, the coefficient estimates for CFO delta 
and CFO vega are negative and statistically significant in the MES regressions (Model 4 
in Table 4) and the coefficients for CEO delta and CFO delta are negative and significant 
at the 1% level in the SRISK regressions (Models 1 and 4 in Table 5). The coefficients for 
CEO vega and CFO vega in the regressions with SRISK as the dependent variable are nega-
tive and highly significant consistent with Models 1 and 4 in Table 5. Thus, these addi-
tional regressions strongly suggest that financial institutions with greater compensation-
based managerial risk-taking incentives are generally associated with lower systemic risk.
Fourth, despite the severe multicollinearity concerns, we also experiment by estimat-
ing regressions in which we simultaneously use the deltas and vegas and their respective 
Table 7  Managerial risk-taking incentives and systemic risk (SRISK) scaled by total assets
The table reports the estimates of six alternative regressions with systemic risk (SRISK) scaled by total 
assets as the dependent variable. SRISKi,t for firm i at time t calculated as the is the expected capital short-
fall in a crisis scenario. Managerial risk-taking incentives are measured with Delta which is the sensitivity 
of a manager’s portfolio to stock price and measures the dollar gain or loss in manager’s wealth if the firm’s 
stock price changes and Vega which is the sensitivity of manager’s portfolio to changes in equity volatility. 
The control variables are defined as follows: Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, Capital ratio 
is the ratio of equity to total assets, Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets, Loans to assets 
is the ratio of net loans to totals assets, Loan growth is the percentage change in loans from year t – 1 to year 
t, Deposits to assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Non-interest income is the ratio of non-inter-
est income to total income. Bank − typek
i
 is a dummy variable for type of financial institution i and Yeary
i
 is 
a dummy variable for fiscal years. The t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard 
errors which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm clustering
***, **, and *Significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively
Variable CEO incentives CFO incentives
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Delta 0.001
(0.73)
− 0.002***
(− 3.13)
0.006*
(1.84)
− 0.005
(− 1.17)
Delta × Year2008 0.001
(0.09)
− 0.008
(− 1.26)
Vega − 0.010*
(− 1.95)
− 0.009**
(− 2.20)
− 0.023**
(− 2.29)
− 0.016**
(− 2.21)
Vega × Year2008 0.001*
(1.90)
− 0.003
(− 1.23)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-type fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 35.74% 29.74% 30.07% 39.78% 34.19% 39.09%
F-stat. 6.5*** 4.95*** 6.61*** 6.74*** 5.3*** 6.55***
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interactions with the crisis year 2008 dummy variable. The estimates of these regres-
sions (not tabulated) are very similar to the interaction regressions reported in Tables 4 
and 5. Specifically, the coefficients for CEO vega are negative and statistically highly 
significant both in the MES and SRISK regressions, and the coefficient for CFO vega 
is negative and significant at the 1% level in the regression with SRISK as the depend-
ent variable. Consistent with our main analysis, the coefficient estimates for CEO 
vega × Year2008 and CFO vega × Year2008 are positive and highly significant throughout 
the alternative regression specifications. The coefficient estimates for CEO delta and 
CEO delta × Year2008 are insignificant, while the coefficient for CFO delta is negative 
and the coefficient for CFO delta × Year2008 positive in the regression with MES as the 
dependent variable.
Fifth, following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we re-estimate all our regression speci-
fications by using the sums of CEO and CFO deltas and CEO and CFO vegas as the incen-
tive variables. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) use the combined incentives of the top five 
highest-paid executives, whereas we only combine the deltas and vegas of the CEOs and 
CFOs. The estimates of these additional regressions (not tabulated) are very similar to the 
estimates reported in Table 4 and 5. The coefficients for the combined deltas and vegas as 
well as for the interaction variables have the same signs and also largely the same signifi-
cance levels as in our main analysis.
Sixth, we winsorize all the variables at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles to examine 
whether our findings are affected by outliers or extreme observations. When the regres-
sions are re-estimated with the winsorized variables (not tabulated), the coefficients for 
the risk-taking incentive variables remain virtually unchanged. Once again, the estimates 
indicate that CEO vega and CFO vega are significantly negatively associated with SRISK, 
and the positive and significant coefficients for the interaction variables demonstrate that 
financial institutions with greater managerial risk-taking incentives in 2007 were associ-
ated with higher MES and SRISK amidst the financial crisis in 2008. We therefore conclude 
that our empirical findings are not driven by outliers.
Seventh, we re-estimate the regressions by using firm fixed-effects instead of bank-type 
fixed-effects to control for omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity. The estimation 
results with firm fixed-effects (not tabulated) are broadly consistent with our main regres-
sions. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for the interaction variables Delta × Year2008 
and Vega × Year2008 are always positive and statistically significant, and therefore suggest 
that the level of systemic risk during the financial crisis was higher for financial institutions 
with greater managerial risk-taking incentives.
Eight, we estimate parsimonious versions of the regressions with Size, Capital ratio, 
and Return on assets as the only control variables to ascertain that our findings are not 
driven by spurious correlations between the variables used in the regressions. Again, the 
coefficients for the variables of interest (not tabulated) are consistent with our main analy-
sis. Our parsimonious regressions indicate that managerial risk-taking incentives are gener-
ally negatively associated with systemic risk, while being significantly positively associ-
ated with the level of risk during the severe financial market turmoil in 2008.
Ninth, we investigate whether our findings are affected by firm-size effects. For this pur-
pose, we divide our sample into two subsamples based on firm-size and then re-estimate 
the regressions (not tabulated). We exclude either the largest 10% or the smallest 10% 
of the financial institutions from the sample. The regressions results based on these two 
subsamples are very similar to the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 and the coefficients 
for the deltas and vegas as well as for the crisis interaction variables have the same signs 
and mostly the same significance levels as in our main regressions. This suggests that our 
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empirical findings are not driven by the largest or the smallest institutions included in the 
sample.
Tenth, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the sample period used in the regres-
sions. Specifically, we re-estimate the regressions using three different truncated subsam-
ples (not tabulated). The first truncated subsample excludes the first sample year 2005, the 
second subsample excludes the crisis year 2008, and the third excludes the last sample 
year 2010. When either year 2005 or 2010 is excluded, the results are broadly consistent 
with the estimates reported in Table 4 and 5, and indicate that financial institutions with 
greater managerial risk-taking at the onset of the financial crisis incentives were associated 
with higher MES and SRISK during the crisis in 2008. When we exclude the crisis year 
2008 from the sample, the coefficient estimates for CEO vega and CFO vega are negative 
and statistically highly significant both in the MES and SRISK regressions, and the coeffi-
cients for CEO delta and CFO delta are statistically insignificant. This provides additional 
evidence that the sensitivities of top executive compensation to stock return volatility are 
negatively associated with the systemic risk of financial institutions, at least outside crisis 
periods.
Eleventh, in order to further examine the effects of the financial crisis on our findings, 
we exclude “troubled” financial institutions from the sample and then re-estimate the 
regressions (not tabulated). We define “troubled” financial institutions as those institu-
tions that either failed or reported losses in excess of 2% of total assets during the crisis. 
The regression results without the “troubled” institutions are very similar to the estimates 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. The overall association between managerial risk-taking incen-
tives and systemic risk is negative, and the positive and statistically significant coefficients 
for Delta × Year2008 and Vega × Year2008 indicate that financial institutions with greater 
managerial risk-taking incentives were positively associated with systemic risk amidst the 
crisis in 2008.
Finally, given that our sample contains different types of financial institutions, we exam-
ine the robustness of our results by restricting the sample to commercial banks and other 
lending institutions with a net loans to total assets ratio of at least 30%. When the regres-
sions are re-estimated with this restricted sample (not tabulated), the results are similar to 
our main analysis. Once again, the coefficients for the interaction variables Delta × Year2008 
and Vega × Year2008 are positive and statistically significant both in the MES and SRISK 
regressions, and therefore suggest that the pre-crisis risk-taking incentives of the top execu-
tives are positively association with systemic risk during the crisis. Thus, we conclude that 
our results are robust to the exclusion of investment banks and non-bank financial services 
firms from the sample.
5  Conclusions
Politicians, regulators, and bank supervision authorities have emphasized the focal role of 
executive compensation policies at banking organizations in the development of the global 
financial crisis of 2008–2009. Moreover, the financial crisis highlighted the importance of 
systemic risk and the fact that risk-taking of individual institutions may create substan-
tial negative externalities on the financial system. In this paper, we examine the linkage 
between systemic risk and compensation-based risk-taking incentives of the top executives. 
The risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation programs are generally 
designed to maximize shareholder value by mitigating managerial risk aversion. However, 
1254 J. Iqbal, S. Vähämaa 
1 3
given the moral hazard problems caused by the too-big-to-fail phenomenon, implicit and 
explicit government guarantees, and deposit insurance systems, greater alignment of incen-
tives between executives and shareholders may encourage excessive risk-taking in the 
financial industry.
In our empirical analysis, we use data on large, publicly traded U.S. financial institutions 
to empirically examine whether systemic risk is associated with the risk-taking incentives 
generated by executive compensation. We measure the risk-taking incentives of CEOs and 
CFOs with the sensitivities of their personal compensation to changes in the stock price 
and stock return volatility of their institutions. Furthermore, we use the marginal expected 
shortfall (MES) and systemic risk (SRISK) proposed by Acharya et al. (2012, 2017), and 
Brownlees and Engle (2017) to gauge the systemic risk of individual financial institutions. 
MES and SRISK provide a measure of the exposure of a given financial institution to aggre-
gate tail shocks in the financial system.
We find an ambiguous relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and sys-
temic risk. Our empirical findings indicate that the sensitivities of top executive compensa-
tion to volatility are generally negatively associated with systemic risk, while the relation 
between executive pay-performance sensitivity and systemic risk is virtually nonexistent. 
These findings are in stark contrast with the hypothesis that greater compensation-based 
managerial risk-taking incentives would increase the level of systemic risk. Nevertheless, 
the documented negative association between vegas and banks’ systemic risk is broadly 
consistent with the less recognized alternative view that compensation-based risk-taking 
incentives may induce risk-averse executives to adopt less risky policies. Our empirical 
findings also demonstrate that the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives 
and banks’ systemic risk is not stable over time. We find that financial institutions with 
greater managerial risk-taking incentives were associated with significantly higher lev-
els of systemic risk in 2008 during the global financial crisis. Our estimates suggest that 
one standard deviation increases in the pre-crisis risk-taking incentives increase MES by 
about 25–40 basis points and SRISK by several percentage points during the crisis. This 
positive association between CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and systemic risk dur-
ing the severe market turmoil in 2008 may indicate that financial institutions with greater 
compensation-based risk-taking incentives were taking more risk before the crisis in order 
to maximize shareholder wealth, and that these risks were then materialized and exposed 
during the financial crisis.
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Appendix 1
List of financial institutions
1 American Express 39 Metlife
2 Associated Banc-Corp. 40 Morgan Stanley
3 Bank of America 41 National City
4 Bank of Hawaii 42 New York Community Bancorp
5 Bank of New York Mellon 43 Northern Trust
6 BB&T 44 PNC Financial Services
7 BBVA Compass Bancshares 45 Principal Financial Group
8 Bear Stearns 46 Prosperity Bancshares
9 BGC Partners 47 Prudential Financial
10 BOK Financial 48 Raymond James Financial
11 Capital One Financial 49 Regions Financial
12 Capitol Federal Financial 50 SEI Investments
13 Charles Schwab 51 Signature Bank
14 Citigroup 52 Sallie Mae
15 City National 53 Sovereign Bank
16 Comerica 54 State Street
17 Commerce Bancshares 55 Stifel Financial
18 Countrywide 56 SunTrust
19 Cullen/Frost Bankers 57 SVB Financial
20 East West Bancorp 58 Synovus Financial
21 Fannie Mae 59 T. Rowe Price Group
22 Fifth Third Bancorp 60 TCF Financial
23 First Citizens BancShares 61 TD Ameritrade
24 First Horizon National 62 TransAtlantic
25 First Niagara Financial 63 UMB Financial
26 Franklin Resources 64 UnionBanCal
27 Fulton Financial 65 US Bancorp
28 Goldman Sachs 66 Valley National Bancorp
29 Hancock 67 Washington Federal
30 Hudson City Bancorp 68 Webster Financial
31 Jefferies Group 69 Wells Fargo
32 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 70 WMI Holdings
33 KeyCorp 71 Zions Bancorporation
34 Legg Mason
35 Lehman Brothers
36 M&T Bank
37 Marshall & Ilsley
38 Merrill Lynch & Co.
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